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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1960, at least 82 major conflicts have traumatized the global 
community.1 Most of these conflicts have occurred in the Third World, 
and in many cases, they may be described as "unconventional." "Un-
conventional conflict" is interpreted in this study to include low-intensity 
conflict (revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare) and certain 
special operations (namely, terrorism and counter-terrorism).2 
Not surprisingly, the United States and the Soviet Union were fre-
quently involved in these conflicts. The United States was involved 
directly in at least 22 major unconventional conflicts in the Third World 
between 1960 and 1987, and the Soviet Union participated in at least 25 
during the same period.3 In at least eighteen instances, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union were involved in the same major conflict, 
almost always supporting different sides.4 
Many additional "minor" conflicts have also taken place. If U.S. 
and Soviet involvement in "minor" unconventional conflicts in the 
Third World, such as U.S. support for the Bolivian government in its 
eventually successful effort to end Che Guevara's insurgency and Soviet 
support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in its effort to 
overthrow Oman's government, are included, the scope of superpower 
involvement in unconventional conflicts in the Third World far surpasses 
even those figures presented above. 
Given the frequency of superpower involvement in unconventional 
Third World conflicts, it is understandable that many policy-makers and 
analysts in the West have sought to dissect and understand the forces that 
lead to and influence that involvement.5 This study follows in that tradi-
tion and seeks both to provide an understanding of Soviet conceptions of 
unconventional conflict in the Third World and to analyze actual Soviet 
policies and strategies in unconventional Third World conflicts. 
SOVIET CONCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS 
IN THE THIRD WORLD 
The Kremlin has been and remains extremely concerned about and 
interested in both U.S. and Soviet policies in the Third World, and about 
the role of both superpowers in conventional and unconventional con-
flict there.' Unfortunately, however, any analysis of Soviet conceptions 
of unconventional conflict in the Third World is complicated by the sim-
ple fact that the Soviets reject "unconventional conflict" as an analytical 
tool. Further, they decry as unacceptable and misleading both "low-
intensity conflict" (LIC) and "counter-terrorism," two of the major 
subsets of unconventional conflict. The reasons that the Kremlin takes 
these positions require further clarification. 
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Unconventional Conflict and "Neoglobalism" 
To the Soviets, unconventional conflict, LIC, and counter-terrorism 
are all manifestations of the American strategy of "neoglobalism" that 
the U.S. allegedly adopted when the Reagan administration came to 
power in January 1981. Soviet analysts agree that the purpose of 
"neoglobalism" was and is straightforward, to foment "global counter-
revolution."7 One Soviet source asserts that the U.S. effort to foment 
"global counter-revolution" via "neoglobalism" has three operational 
components: "classical counter-revolutionary operations," "an active 
battle against 'terrorism,' " and "prorevolutionary operations." The 
same source also maintains that "neoglobalism" preaches "military 
solutions to regional problems on a global scale."' 
Some Soviet authorities tie "neoglobalism" directly to LIC. One 
Soviet analyst argues that "neoglobalism" "began its life as the pseudo-
scientific theory of low-intensity conflict,'" while another condemned 
low-intensity conflict as a concept that presupposes U.S. military in-
terference in the Third World, supports counter-revolution, and 
demands U.S. intervention in and control over local military conflicts.10 
"Neoglobalism" and LIC are not criticized in isolation; counter-
terrorism also receives its share of abuse. Soviet spokesmen argue that 
the purpose of American counter-terrorist activities is to legitimize U.S. 
intervention into the affairs of others and to serve as a cover for U.S. 
state-supported terrorism. As part of this effort, Soviet spokesmen main-
tain that the United States has launched a "massive misinformation" 
campaign that attempts to link the U.S.S.R. to terrorism. The Kremlin 
of course asserts that the U.S.S.R. is a resolute foe of terrorism, and that 
it is the United States that supports terrorism. As evidence for this asser-
tion, Soviet authorities point to U.S. support for the "Somoza bandits" 
in Nicaragua (the Contras), "dushmen" in Afghanistan (the mujaha-
deen), and other groups that receive overt or covert U.S. assistance." 
Taken together, then, both low-intensity conflict and counter-
terrorism as they are practiced by the United States are heavily criticized 
and condemned by the Soviet Union; by implication, unconventional 
conflict is similarly derided. Indeed, other Soviet sources link these and 
other "interconnected and mutually complementary" aspects of contem-
porary U.S. foreign policy into a single system that has as its objective 
"to undermine socialism as a system."12 
How is this American strategy implemented? Soviet analysts claim 
to perceive three distinct American activities: 1) spreading "falsehoods" 
about the Soviet Union; 2) bolstering anti-communist regimes with 
economic and military assistance; and 3) "stoking the fires of regional 
conflicts" with military, political, and economic pressure and blackmail. 
The third activity, "stoking the fires of regional conflicts," in turn 
has six constituent elements: a) backing openly "anti-popular counter-
revolutionary groups"; b) extending American covert actions against na-
tional liberation movements; c) re-establishing imperial control in newly-
free countries; d) splitting the Non-Aligned Movement and destroying it 
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from within; e) undermining governments disliked by Washington; and 
f) preventing people from attaining their inalienable right to choose their 
own social system, friends, and allies.13 
"Neoglobalism" is thus seen in the Kremlin as simply the latest ren-
dition of American efforts dating back to the Truman Doctrine to 
establish American global hegemony. To the Soviets, U.S. foreign policy 
remains blatantly imperial and neocolonial, with neoglobalism and its 
constituent elements of unconventional conflict, low-intensity conflict, 
and counter-terrorism designed to maximize American opportunities for 
global intervention, minimize chances of conflict with the Soviet Union, 
and undermine the world socialist system. 
As far as the Soviets are concerned, the United States does all this in 
the pursuit of profit and power. Lenin may have written Im-
perialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916, but Soviet analysts 
of today have not strayed from his interpretation of the motive forces 
behind American—and other Western—foreign policies. Thus the 
Kremlin sees the United States as seeking, via neoglobalism and its con-
stituent elements, to obtain a world-wide "military-political guarantee of 
free movement of capital." To do this, Lenin's heirs claim the United 
States seeks: 
. . . attainment of military superiority by the U.S.A. 
over the U.S.S.R., strengthening of the system of 
military-political alliances, active use openly and covert-
ly of force against revolutionary movements in the 
Third World, policies of "economic warfare," and an 
ideological offensive against socialist countries under 
the slogan "democracy against totalitarianism."14 
Soviet Conceptions of Conflict in the Third World 
Since the Soviets reject unconventional conflict, low-intensity con-
flict, and counter-terrorism as creations of American counter-revolution, 
how then do they assess and" codify conflicts in the Third World? 
To begin with, Soviet analysis of military conflict proceeds on two 
levels. The first level is socio-political; it is multi-dimensional, and in-
cludes a variety of political, economic, sociological, ideological, and 
military factors that are allegedly class-based. It is the more important of 
the two levels, for without proper and accurate socio-political analysis 
and policy, success at the second level is rendered more difficult or even 
impossible. 
The second level is military-technical; it is concerned with the 
military character of given conflicts, with ways to prepare for conflicts, 
and with specific forms of military engagement.11 It is a critical level, but 
clearly subservient to the first. 
With the stress that Marxist-Leninists place on class-based analysis 
of societal relationships, placing primary emphasis on socio-political 
analysis of conflict is not surprising. Neither is it surprising that Soviet 
codification systems of conflict have in their various iterations 
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emphasized the class content of war. For example, one of the most recent 
Soviet codifications of conflict and war, a 1982 study entitled Fun-
damentals of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War and the Army identified 
four major types of war: 1) wars between opposing social systems; 
2) wars between capitalist states; 3) wars between proletariat workers 
and monopoly bourgeois forces of reaction; and 4) wars between peoples 
struggling for independence and those imperial, colonial, and 
neocolonial forces seeking to suppress them." A year later, another 
Soviet analyst, Ye. Rybkin, asserted that a fifth type of war also existed, 
wars between developing states. (He originally made this assertion in 
1968.) Importantly, Rybkin in his 1983 formulation asserted that wars 
between developing states were caused by traditional imperialist 
economics and politics, and by "local causes" that depended on the 
specific nature of the policies adopted by the rulers of developing 
states." 
Here, it is important to note that the Soviet Union remains a strong 
supporter at the declaratory level of the concept of "wars of national 
liberation" originally put forward by Nikita Khrushchev in 1960, even 
though such wars do not specifically appear in either the 1982 or 1983 
typology." Rather, "wars of national liberation" were subsumed within 
Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine's categories three and four, 
and in Rybkin's fifth category. 
Khrushchev's typology of "wars of national liberation" considered 
such conflicts "just" wars that pitted colonized peoples against an im-
perial or neocolonialist power, or against a repressive domestic govern-
ment that exploited the people that it governed either on its own or at the 
behest of an external imperial or neocolonial power. Each of these types 
of "wars of national liberation" appeared in different form in the 1982 
and 1983 typologies. 
Additionally, Khrushchev visualized that imperial powers and their 
indigenous class allies in Third World states would seek to prevent na-
tional liberation movements from achieving victory by launching "local 
wars." Sometimes local wars would be launched by imperialists in reac-
tion to national liberation efforts, and sometimes they would be initiated 
by imperialists to curtail national liberation activities before they began, 
but they would always be unjust. Local wars were particularly 
dangerous, the Soviets asserted, because they could escalate into wars 
between capitalist states and even wars between different social systems. 
Thus, even though local wars disappeared in the 1982 and 1983 
typologies, they were essentially subsumed under category four. 
It is evident, then, that the Soviets consider concepts such as un-
conventional conflict, low-intensity conflict, and counter-terrorism as 
subterfuges through which the ruling bourgeois class in the United States 
legitimizes its actions against revolutionary groups, national liberation 
movements, "progressive" governments, and other forward-thinking 
forces around the world. Soviet authorities frequently cite U.S. policies 
toward Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Libya, Nicaragua, 
Syria, and other Third World states as evidence of this U.S. offensive 
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against national liberation and social progress." Even General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev has joined this Soviet chorus, as shown in his 1986 
response to a question asked by a correspondent for the Algerian 
magazine Revolution Africaine: 
The American administration has offered its em-
brace to the Afghan dushmen, bandits from UNITA in 
Angola, and to the South African racists . . . . I do not 
doubt that if it were not for American interference in 
the internal affairs of other states regional conflicts 
would be on the wane and be solved in far simpler and 
more just ways.20 
Gorbachev's Revolution Africaine interview was not the only occa-
sion that the Soviet General Secretary expressed this opinion. He offered 
a similar assessment during his March 30, 1987 dinner speech given dur-
ing British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Moscow: 
. . . in the West there still are quite a few people with a 
penchant for talking about the freedom of choice. But 
they really mean the choice of the capitalist system. 
However, when this or that people—in Nicaragua, 
Africa, the Middle East, or Asia—actually reveals a 
desire to look for a different road of its own, which will 
suit it better, it finds its way immediately barred with 
dollars, missiles, or mercenaries. They start with 
hypocrisy and end with bloodshed. 
As a result, the "volcanoes" of regional conflicts 
are fuming.21 
According to Soviet arguments, the obverse is equally true: Soviet 
support for revolutionary groups and national liberation movements as 
well as all other anti-colonial states and "progressive" groups is com-
pletely legitimate because such groups are on the side of "social progress, 
national liberation, and peace." In some cases the Soviets even feel that 
it is legitimate to aid and support groups that the West defines as "ter-
rorists" if those groups oppose what the Kremlin defines as imperialism, 
colonialism, and neocolonialism. The Soviets therefore decry responses 
taken against these groups by the U.S. or Western European states as 
counter-revolutionary reaction, not true and legitimate counter-
terrorism. This is exactly how the Soviets responded after the U.S. forced 
down the Egyptian jet carrying the "Achille Lauro" hijackers and the 
U.S. raid on Libya in April 1986.22 
Thus, it is evident that U.S. and Soviet terminologies and outlooks 
frequently differ, that they differ for reasons of ideological and 
analytical preconception, and that although U.S. and Soviet leaders may 
sometimes use the same terms, they may mean completely different 
things and not even realize it. 
This is a dangerous but not surprising situation. The misunderstan-
ding that could flow from such confusion could heighten tension and the 
possibility of conflict between the two superpowers even when neither 
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side desires heightened tension or conflict. The rest of this study, then, is 
devoted to analyzing Soviet policies and strategies in unconventional 
conflicts in the Third World with the full realization that many Soviet 
analytical and operational constructs are considerably different from 
American ones. 
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL LEVEL OF 
SOVIET POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
Soviet analysis of military conflict takes place on both socio-
political and military-technical levels. The Soviets consider the socio-
political level more fundamental than the military-technical level, for 
without a proper understanding of the "correlation of forces" at the 
socio-political level, it is more difficult or even impossible to develop cor-
rect military-technical policies and strategies." Consequently this 
analysis of Soviet policies and strategies toward unconventional conflict 
in the Third World will begin at this level. 
Importantly, at the socio-political level Soviet analysts stress the in-
tegration and coordination of political, sociological, economic, 
ideological, and military operations in the conduct of policy. This is true 
regardless of whether the issue at hand is revolution and national libera-
tion, counter-revolution, or terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
While ultimate policy responsibility resides in the Politburo of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Kremlin's stress on in-
tegration and coordination of policy at the socio-political level means that 
several prominent Soviet agencies play roles in Soviet policy and strategy 
toward unconventional conflict in the Third World. The most prominent 
are the International Department of the CPSU, the KGB, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense. The Kremlin also frequently 
relies on and collaborates with foreign communist parties, workers' par-
ties, international front and progressive movements, and cultural societies 
to help it implement its policies and strategies; in most cases, the CPSU In-
ternational Department oversees these relationships.24 
This integrated and coordinated multi-dimensional approach to the 
conduct of policy provides Soviet decision-makers with a variety of op-
tions from which to choose as they fashion policies and strategies toward 
Third World (and other) contingencies. In brief, Soviet policies and 
strategies toward unconventional conflicts are extremely flexible. This 
flexibility is significant enough to require separate examination of Soviet 
policies and strategies toward each of the three major manifestations of 
unconventional conflict examined here—revolution and national libera-
tion, counter-revolution, and terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
Revolution and National Liberation 
Soviet declaratory positions have always firmly supported revolu-
tion and national liberation, and the U.S.S.R. even states in Article 28 of 
the 1977 Soviet Constitution that one of its foreign policy aims is to sup-
port "the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social 
progress."25 
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It should therefore come as no surprise that the U.S.S.R. provided 
and provides extensive assistance of many types to revolutionary groups 
and national liberation movements around the world. Nevertheless, 
throughout its public declarations, the Kremlin argues that it supports 
revolution but does not export revolution. The dividing line between the 
two may be unclear in the West, but to the Kremlin, revolutions are the 
product of indigenous forces that the U.S.S.R. simply assists. 
Soviet assistance to Third World revolution and national liberation 
comes in a variety of forms with diplomatic support in the international 
community, propaganda and disinformation (active measures), indirect 
military assistance via third countries, and direct military assistance be-
ing four of the most prominent. Each of these forms of assistance must 
be examined individually, even though they are most frequently used in 
combination. 
Soviet diplomatic support to revolutionary groups and national 
liberation movements is often overlooked as a means of Soviet involve-
ment in unconventional conflict because it frequently appears benign. 
Yet, it is an important part of Soviet strategies and policies because over 
time such efforts, if played out correctly, can add to the tangible and in-
tangible strengths of revolutionary groups or national liberation 
movements. The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam 
(NLFSV), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the African 
National Congress (ANC) could all attest to that. All three—and other 
groups as well—have gained increased international, diplomatic and 
political credibility as a result of Soviet willingness to provide diplomatic 
support. On occasion, this greater credibility has also aided their efforts 
to acquire more concrete forms of aid from sources additional to Soviet 
and pro-Soviet states. 
At the same time, the U.S.S.R. frequently maintains ties with non-
ruling communist parties in Third World states. For example, in Central 
America alone the CPSU maintains close relations with Costa Rica's 
legal Popular Vanguard Party, Panama's legal People's Party of 
Panama, the illegal Guatemalan Party of Labor, the illegal Communist 
Party of El Salvador, and the illegal Honduran Communist Party." One 
measure of the degree of closeness of Soviet relations with these parties 
could be found in January 1986 when a high-ranking CPSU Central 
Committee delegation journeyed to Panama to attend the Eighth 
People's Party of Panama Congress." It is clear that the U.S.S.R. pro-
vides diplomatic support and ideological guidance to these and other 
Third World communist parties. Whether Soviet support extends to 
military and economic assistance is uncertain, but probable. 
This does not mean that non-communist groups or movements that 
receive Soviet diplomatic support are necessarily either friends or allies 
of the U.S.S.R.; indeed, in many cases they are groups or movements 
pursuing nationalist or anti-repressive objectives that the Kremlin may, 
for its own purposes, find it advantageous to support. Chief among 
those purposes are ongoing Soviet efforts to expand the Kremhn's own 
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presence and influence in selected locations in the Third World and to 
reduce U.S. and Western presence and influence in the Third World 
wherever they may be found.2* 
Nevertheless, in an operational sense, Soviet extension of diplomatic 
support is only one of several components of Soviet assistance to revolu-
tionary groups and national liberation movements engaged in unconven-
tional conflict. Another component of Soviet assistance is Soviet pro-
paganda and disinformation efforts on behalf of particular groups and 
movements. 
Soviet global propoganda efforts are carried out primarily by Tass 
and Novosti, the two principal Soviet news agencies, both of which 
operate as instruments of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Tass 
maintains about 100 overseas offices, while Novosti maintains cor-
respondents in 80 countries. 
Frequently, Tass and Novosti serve as outlets for Soviet disinforma-
tion efforts. Usually Tass and Novosti repeat stories planted in pro-
Soviet publications in the developing world and elsewhere in an effort to 
lend additional credibility to the planted story. These disinformation ef-
forts are one aspect of Soviet "active measures," and are reportedly run 
by the First Directorate of the KGB and coordinated by the CPSU's In-
ternational Department. The First Directorate operates a global program 
of falsified news reports designed to undermine the credibility of 
"enemies" of the Soviet state and further Soviet foreign policy objec-
tives. Frequently, First Directorate activities are directed toward Third 
World states where revolutionary activity is taking place or where unrest 
that could lead to "national liberation"—and not coincidentally anti-
Americanism—can be fomented. Thus, in the 1980s alone the First 
Directorate has issued false stories that the United States would deploy 
cruise missiles in South Africa (November 1982) and that the U.S. am-
bassador to the United Nations had delivered a speech highly critical of 
India (February 1983). It also forged documents that implicated the 
United States in a plot against the Rawlings government in Ghana 
(March 1983) and forged U.S. Embassy letters in Nigeria showing that 
the U.S. ambassador ordered the assassination of a Nigerian presidential 
candidate (April 1983)." More recently, in 1985 and 1986 the First Direc-
torate planted stories around the world that AIDS was the result of a 
Pentagon bacteriological warfare experiment that had run out of con-
trol, and that the deadly AIDS virus was spread primarily by American 
servicemen. In 1988, Soviet media began playing the story that American 
adoption agencies had bought babies in Central America to be brought 
to the United States for the express purpose of killing them and using 
their organs for organ transplants. These Soviet propaganda and disin-
formation efforts are rendered more effective than they might otherwise 
be since they are frequently scattered in with easily verifiable stories. 
Soviet propaganda and disinformation seeks less to influence the 
immediate revolutionary or military climate than to prepare the ground-
work for future alterations of the "correlation of forces." On occasion, 
specific groups or movements may have been identified as the hoped-for 
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beneficiaries of future alterations of the "correlation of forces," but on 
other occasions the Kremlin is equally content to undermine whatever 
levels of U.S. or Western influence may exist without a specific 
beneficiary in mind. The Kremlin's thinking is nevertheless straightfor-
ward: a revolutionary climate may not presently exist in a given country, 
but propaganda and disinformation could over time increase levels of 
public disenchantment and increase the possibility of revolution. Thus, 
propaganda and disinformation must be considered a tool of unconven-
tional conflict that the Kremlin uses in support of revolution and na-
tional liberation. 
Disinformation is only one component of "active measures." "Ac-
tive measures" also includes sabotage, "wet operations" 
(assassinations), and related activities. The Kremlin prefers to tender 
training, intelligence, and limited operational support to those revolu-
tionary groups and national liberation movements that it favors in regard 
to these activities, but it is assumed that the Kremlin's own agents also 
participate in "active measures" in Third World states during especially 
sensitive operations. As is the case with propaganda and disinformation, 
more violent forms of "active measures" must also be considered a tool 
of Soviet unconventional conflict policies and strategies. 
Indirect Soviet military assistance via third countries is another com-
ponent of Soviet policies and strategies. Cuba has been and remains a 
favorite Soviet conduit of assistance whether via transhipment or direct 
Cuban involvement; it is well-documented that Soviet arms reached El 
Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) via 
Cuba and Nicaragua,30 and Cuban troops originally arrived in Angola to 
support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 
before the MPLA formed a functioning government. They remain there 
today. Further, the Kremlin frequently coordinates provision of military 
assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements 
with its Eastern European 311165.31 
Of course, whenever military assistance via third countries is con-
sidered, the possibility exists that third countries transfer weapons to the 
end user without approval of the original provider. Thus, some room for 
uncertainty may be present. Nevertheless, when Soviet arms find their 
way to the FMLN in El Salvador via Cuba and Nicaragua, to insurgent 
forces in Chad and the Sudan via Libya, and to rebels in Zaire via 
Angola, the pattern is pronounced enough to argue that, at a minimum, 
the Kremlin understands that such transfers will be made even if it does 
not formally approve them. 
However, it is direct Soviet military assistance to revolutionary 
groups and national liberation movements that is the Kremlin's most ef-
fective tool in promoting revolution and national liberation. Unfor-
tunately, no figures are available on the absolute level of Soviet 
assistance to these groups and movements, but one measure of the level 
of assistance may be the scope of assistance; in Africa alone, the Kremlin 
has provided arms directly to national liberation movements as diverse as 
the FLN in Algeria, the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, 
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PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and to a lesser degree ZAPU 
in Zimbabwe. All later became ruling parties. It is currently tendering 
direct assistance to SWAPO in Namibia, the ANC in South Africa, the 
Somali National Salvation Front and several other groups, and Soviet 
military assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation 
movements is not limited to Africa." 
Despite this, absolute levels of Soviet military assistance to revolu-
tionary groups and national liberation movements has been small, at 
least in comparison to the levels of assistance that the U.S.S.R. extends 
to such groups and movements once they attain power. Thus, while Gor-
bachev's claim that the U.S.S.R. is "firmly convinced that 'pushing' 
revolution from outside, especially by military means, is futile and im-
permissible" is demonstrably an overstatment," neither may it be claim-
ed that the U.S.S.R. frequently provides large-scale military assistance to 
revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. 
It must also be recognized that in true Leninist form, a small hard 
core of dedicated revolutionaries may be all that is needed to foment 
unrest, paralyze a government, and precipitate a revolution. Indeed, it 
was on this basis that Lenin pursued revolution in the Russia of the Pro-
visional Government. Thus, revolutionary groups and national libera-
tion movements may not need many weapons as far as the Soviets are 
concerned; equally plausible, the Soviets may believe that large-scale 
military assistance to such groups and movements may precipitate exten-
sive U.S. and other Western responses. 
The Soviets also on occasion support negotiations as an adjunct to 
armed struggle. For example, the Soviets approved of the Geneva 
Agreements that ended the Franco-Vietminh conflict in 1954," and they 
also supported the 1974 accords that temporarily established a transi-
tional government in Angola." Additionally, the Soviets have continual-
ly sought an international conference on the Middle East, one task of 
which would be to address PLO interests," and the Kremlin played a ma-
jor role in negotiations on southern Africa during 1987 and 1988. 
However, the Kremlin's support for negotiations in revolutionary 
situations has not been universal. The Soviets, in the past, did not favor 
negotiations on southern Africa, undoubtedly because of the perceived 
"correlation of forces" that exists there. Neither are they enamored of 
the occasional possibility of negotiations in El Salvador. As well, the 
Soviets were extremely skeptical about the negotiations that led to in-
dependence for Zimbabwe. In the case of Zimbabwe Soviet sources even 
predicted that "a fierce political struggle" would erupt after in-
dependence." In sum, then, it is evident that the U.S.S.R. sees negotia-
tions as a tool to be used as individual situations warrant in support of 
revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. 
What, then, is the record of Soviet support to revolutionary groups 
and national liberation movements in Third World unconventional con-
flicts? Clearly, the Kremlin hopes that via diplomatic support, propagan-
da, disinformation, and other "active measures" the groundwork may 
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be set for future revolutions. At the same time, these policy tools are 
useful to strengthen ongoing revolutions. Additionally, the Kremlin pro-
vides direct and indirect military assistance to established revolutionary 
groups and movements, though only rarely does the U.S.S.R. provide 
large quantities of tangible direct or indirect assistance to revolutionary 
groups and national liberation movements before they seize power. The 
case of Cuban assistance to the MPLA in Angola before the MPLA ob-
tained power is perhaps the most significant exception. Rather, the 
Kremlin waits to provide large quantities of tangible direct or indirect 
assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements 
until after they have seized power. Even so, it must be stressed that in 
revolutionary situations provision of small quantities of assistance may 
be enough to swing the tide of struggle. 
Counter-Revolution 
The Kremlin does not limit its role in unconventional conflicts to 
supporting revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. In 
recent years it has found itself increasingly involved in opposing what it 
calls "counter-revolution." This is a relatively recent phenomenon, but 
for understandable reasons. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Kremlin in 
some respects was in an advantageous position regarding its relations 
with the Third World. With no allies and few friends in the Third World, 
the Kremlin could freely criticize Western policies and help breed and 
support revolution with few threats to its own interests and positions. In 
several cases where the U.S.S.R. did develop friendships with Third 
World leaders, those leaders were overthrown. For example, Indonesia's 
Sukarno, a one-time Soviet friend who drifted toward China, was 
removed from power in 1965; Ben Bella lost his presidency in Algeria in 
the same year; Nkrumah was ousted in Ghana in 1966; and Keita was 
overthrown in Mali in 1968. 
This situation changed during the 1970s. By the end of that decade, 
the U.S.S.R. had developed an extensive network of interests and posi-
tions throughout the Third World. These interests and positions were 
reflected by the system of 10 Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation that 
the Kremlin by 1980 had concluded with Third World states," by the 
Kremlin's far-flung program of economic assistance," by its even more 
widely-distributed and much more sizeable military aid program,40 and 
by its developing force projection capabilities.41 
This was a categorically new situation for the Soviet Union in the 
Third World, accompanied by new experiences, most notably the out-
break and continuation of low-intensity conflict against Soviet friends, 
clients, and allies in the Third World.42 By 1982, at least six different un-
conventional conflicts raged in the Third World states or underdeveloped 
socialist states closely aligned with the U.S.S.R.: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Nicaragua. To the Soviets, these 
were all "counter-revolutionary" wars fueled by internal forces of reac-
tion and external counter-revolutionary forces headed by the United 
States. Nevertheless the U.S.S.R. had to respond. 
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Respond it did. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union sent in its own 
military forces to try to stem the "counter-revolutionary" tide. In 
Angola and Ethiopia, Cuban forces fought and continue to fight against 
local rebels; the Cubans are aided by East German, Czech, and other 
Eastern European advisers, and arms are provided by the Soviets. In 
Ethiopia, at least some military operations have been planned by Soviet 
generals. In Cambodia, Vietnamese occupation is greatly abetted by 
Soviet assistance; one Soviet military attache even proclaimed that the 
Kremlin "controlled every drop of fuel used by the Vietnamese in Cam-
bodia."*3 In Nicaragua, after a slow start, the Kremlin pumped in over 
$1 billion of military assistance by 1987; Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern 
European military and paramilitary advisers were also present, but few 
agreed about how large a presence they maintained.44 Only in Mozambi-
que did the Kremlin show hesitancy to come to grips fully with counter-
revolutionary" challenges to its friends, allies, and clients in the Third 
World.45 
But here, it must be emphatically pointed out that under Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union on occasion has evidenced a greater 
restraint than previously seen in its provision of support to friendly states 
fighting counter-revolutionary forces. The Kremlin decided to withdraw 
from Afghanistan; proved instrumental in the movement toward accom-
modation in southern Africa; and applied pressure on Vietnam to ac-
celerate its withdrawal from Cambodia. Thus, under Gorbachev, the 
U.S.S.R. in some instances has proved more cautious in the willingness 
to oppose "counter-revolution." 
Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the Soviet Union's willingness to 
provide military assistance to its friends, allies, and clients in Third 
World states. One measure of that willingness is the presence of Soviet 
and Eastern European military advisers and technicians in Third World 
states. As Table 1 shows, most Soviet and Eastern European military ad-
visers and technicians in the Third World are in "socialist-path" states, 
that is, those states that the Kremlin believes are most likely eventually to 
join the communist world.46 At the same time, most Soviet and Eastern 
European military advisers and technicians are concentrated in socialist-
path states that are experiencing unconventional conflicts. Thus, 88 per-
cent of all Soviet and Eastern European military advisers in the Third 
World in 1985 were in socialist-path states, and 37 percent of all Soviet 
and Eastern European military advisers in the Third World in 1985 were 
in socialist-path states that were experiencing unconventional conflicts. 
Soviet responses to "counter-revolution" go beyond provision of 
direct and indirect military assistance. In all cases, the Soviets pursue 
programs of international diplomatic support for the beleaguered 
regimes, and in all cases, international propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns are implemented as well. In many cases, these efforts are 
directed as much at swaying public opinion in the United States and 
Western Europe to oppose aid to "counter-revolutionary" groups as at 
building support within threatened Third World states for the "revolu-
tionary" regime.47 Other than this broadened focus, Soviet diplomatic 
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Table 1. Soviet and Eastern European Military Advisers and 
Technicians in Third World Socialist-Path States and in 
Third World Socialist-Path States Fighting 
Unconventional Conflicts—1985 
Soviet and Eastern European 
Military Advisers and Tech-
Socialist-Path States' nicians in Country, 1985 
Afghanistan24 2,025 
Algeria 615 
Angola2 1,050 
Congo 70 
Ethiopia2 2,600 
Guinea-Bissau 85 
Iraq 1,300 
Libya 3,300 
Madagascar 75 
Mali 50 
Mozambique2 950 
Nicaragua2 160 
North Yemen 310 
Sao Tome/Principe 150 
South Yemen 1,100 
Syria 2,300 
Tanzania 90 
Total Military Advisers/Technicians 
Presence in Socialist-Path States 16,230 
Total Military Advisers/Technicians 
Presence in Socialist-Path States 
Fighting Unconventional Conflicts 6,785 
Total Military Advisers/Technicians 
Presence in Third World 18,375 
'Only those socialist-path states for which figures are available are listed 
'Socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts 
'Soviet combat troops are not included 
SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986, 
pp. 124-125. 
38 
Conflict Quarterly 
support, propaganda and disinformation, and other "active measures" 
in opposition to counter-revolution are quite similar to the same Soviet 
activities supporting revolutionary groups and national liberation 
movements described earlier. 
Additionally, the Kremlin provides economic assistance to its 
friends, allies, and clients in the Third World as they attempt to create "a 
society of a new kind." This assistance goes to many Third World states, 
not just to those threatened by "counter-revolution" or those that the 
Kremlin chooses to define as "socialist-path." 
Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. clearly targets this assistance at particular 
states. Fifty percent of all Soviet economic assistance to Third World 
states in 1984 and 198S went to socialist-path states; 25 percent of all 
Soviet economic aid in the same years went to socialist-path states that 
were embroiled in unconventional conflicts. If Soviet economic aid to 
Vietnam is included (slightly over $1 billion per year for 1984 and 1985) 
as a result of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, these percentages 
move upward to 65 percent and 47 percent, respectively. (See Table 2.) 
Table 2. Soviet Economic Assistance to Socialist-Path 
States and to Socialist-Path States Fighting 
Unconventional Conflicts, 1984-85 
in Millions of U.S. Dollars 
Economic Assistance Extended 
Socialist-Path States' 1984 1985 TOTAL 
Afghanistan2 237 
Algeria x 
Ethiopia2 276 
Mali 15 
Nicaragua2 ~200 
Syria 820 
Total Economic Assistance 
to Socialist-Path States 1,548 865 2,413 
Total Economic Assistance 
to Socialist-Path States 
Fighting Unconventional 
325 
340 
X 
X 
200 
X 
562 
340 
276 
15 
~400 
820 
Conflicts 
Total Economic Assistance 
to Third World States 
713 
2,482 
525 
2,390 
1,238 
4,872 
'Only those socialist-path states for which figures are available are listed 
'Socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts 
SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986, 
pp. 112-113. 
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In part the presence of Soviet and Eastern European economic ad-
visers and technicians in Third World states follows this pattern, as Table 
3 shows. Thus, in 1985, 81 percent of all Soviet and Eastern European 
economic advisers and technicians in the Third World were in socialist-
path states. However, only 8 percent of all Soviet and Eastern Europe 
economic advisers and technicians in the Third World were in socialist-
path states fighting unconventional conflicts. The significant reduction 
in the percentage of advisers and technicians in socialist-path states 
fighting unconventional conflicts as compared to the percentage in 
socialist-path states may reflect both Soviet emphasis on military solu-
tions in such states and Soviet hesitancy to introduce civilians to loca-
tions of conflict. 
The Soviets also provide extensive ideological guidance and pro-
grammatic direction to their friends, allies, and clients who are fighting 
"counter-revolution." The CPSU has concluded party-to-party 
agreements with ruling parties in practically every socialist-path state,4* 
and in at least two cases, in Afghanistan and Ethiopia, evidence suggests 
that the Kremlin has laid out details for how the "new society" will be 
structured.49 These efforts to provide ideological guidance and program-
matic direction are accompanied by a wide range of educational, scien-
tific, cultural, and other contacts.50 
As in the case of economic assistance, Soviet provision of 
ideological guidance and programmatic direction does not go only to 
Third World socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts. It 
goes to other socialist-path states as well, especially those headed by 
"vanguard parties" at the forefront of revolutionary change." Both 
guidance and direction are part of a broader and more comprehensive set 
of Soviet policies in the Third World. 
Even so, their role in the struggle against "counter-revolution" can 
neither be overlooked nor dismissed. The Kremlin sees efforts to institu-
tionalize revolutionary changes in society not only as tools with which to 
bring about social progress, but also tools with which to combat 
"counter-revolution." It is therefore both useful and important to note 
that at the Twenty Sixth CPSU Congress in 1981, the Soviets laid out the 
details of how they defined socialist-path states. To the Soviets, socialist-
path states are those countries where: 1) imperialist monopolies are 
gradually being weeded out; 2) feudal lords and "big local bourgeoisie" 
are being eliminated over time; 3) foreign capital activity (but not 
necessarily foreign capital) is being restricted; 4) the "people's state" is 
taking over major economic sectors; 5) a transition to planned develop-
ment is taking place; 6) agricultural cooperatives are being encouraged; 
7) the "role of the working people in public affairs" is increasing; 8) the 
state apparatus is being strengthened with "national cadre loyal to the 
people" acquiring positions of authority; 9) anti-imperialist foreign 
policies are being pursued; and 10) revolutionary parties are working for 
the masses." 
Indeed, in many socialist-path states, a number of these reforms are 
in fact being institutionalized. Yet one of the supreme ironies of modern 
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Table 3. Soviet and Eastern European Economic Advisers 
and Technicians in Third World Socialist-Path States 
Fighting Unconventional Conflicts, 1985 
Soviet & Eastern European 
Economic Advisers & Tech-
Socialist-Path States' nicians in Country, 1985 
Afghanistan2 5,225 
Algeria 17,150 
Angola2 2,475 
Congo 2,350 
Guinea-Bissau 210 
Iraq 15,626 
Libya 44,000 
Madagascar 170 
Mali 505 
Mozambique2 1,400 
Nicaragua2 695 
North Yemen 650 
Sao Tome/Principe 150 
South Yemen 3,250 
Syria 5,500 
Tanzania 110 
Total Economic Advisers/Technicians 
Presence in Socialist/Path States 99,465 
Total Economic Advisers/Technicians 
Presence in Socialist-Path States 
Fighting Unconventional Conflicts 9,795 
Total Economic Advisers/Technicians 
Presence in Third World 122,745 
•Only those socialist-path states for which figures are available 
'Socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts 
SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986, 
pp. 124-125. 
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Marxism-Leninism is that while these efforts to create a "new society" 
may be applauded by the U.S.S.R. and are seen by the U.S.S.R. as a way 
to prevent counter-revolution, these efforts to "restructure" society are, 
in several countries, the major impetus behind "counter-revolution." 
This is especially true in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. 
For the Kremlin, then, ideological guidance and programmatic 
direction is a two-edged sword that must be used very carefully in the 
U.S.S.R.'s efforts to combat counter-revolution. On the one hand, it 
may be an effective tool over time as the control of a "vanguard party" 
becomes more pervasive in a particular country; on the other hand, to 
move too quickly with plans to create a socialist-path state and thereby 
eliminate "counter-revolution" could foment the very "counter-
revolution" that the U.S.S.R. and its friend/ally/client seek to avoid. 
What, then, is the record of Soviet support for socialist-path states 
fighting unconventional conflicts against "counter-revolution?" It is evi-
dent that the U.S.S.R. approaches "counter-revolution" as part of 
broader strategies toward the Third World and more particularly 
socialist-path states in the Third World. At the same time there is 
evidence that the U.S.S.R. in its military and economic assistance pro-
grams places a proportionately larger share of emphasis on programs to 
those socialist-path states that are fighting unconventional conflicts. The 
same is true for military adviser and technician presence, but not for 
economic adviser and technician presence. 
Further, the broadly-based nature of Soviet support for "counter-
revolutionary" efforts on the part of socialist-path states cannot be 
separated in any "neat" manner from Soviet support for 
"restructuring" society in socialist-path states. This is an important 
point, for it is often argued in the West that Western support for 
"counter-revolutionary" groups strengthens the ties of socialist-path 
states with the U.S.S.R. 
There may indeed be some legitimacy to that observation. However, 
on the basis of evidence presented here and elsewhere," two other con-
clusions are more warranted and less debatable. First, the presence of un-
conventional conflict in a socialist-path state enhances the military con-
tent of an already-existing broad range of contacts between the socialist-
path state and the U.S.S.R. Second, the presence of unconventional con-
flict in a socialist-path state accelerates the strengthening of ties between 
the socialist-path state and the U.S.S.R. across the board, ties that the 
Kremlin believes would probably strengthen even in the absence of con-
flict. 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
Little can be added at the socio-political level concerning Soviet sup-
port for and opposition to terrorism and counter-terrorism. As discussed 
earlier, the U.S.S.R. and the United States begin their analyses from 
significantly different points of departure. As far as the Kremlin is con-
cerned, if the U.S.S.R. identifies a particular body as a revolutionary 
group or a national liberation movement, then many steps that that body 
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takes in support of revolution or national hberation are by definition not 
terrorist. Conversely, steps that the U.S. and other Western states take in 
opposition to such groups are state-supported terrorist actions. 
The Soviet Union's declaratory perspective on terrorism and on 
many aspects of what the West would describe as counter-terrorism was 
put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Twenty Seventh Congress of 
the CPSU in February 1986. "The U.S.S.R. rejects terrorism in princi-
ple," the General Secretary declared, "and is willing to cooperate active-
ly with other states to eradicate it."54 However, Gorbachev's views on 
what constituted terrorism were somewhat broader than those generally 
accepted in the West: 
Undeclared wars, the exporting of counterrevolu-
tion in all its forms, political assassinations, the taking 
of hostages, airplane hijacking, explosions in the 
streets, at airports and railway stations—this is the 
disgusting face of terrorism, which its sponsors try to 
cover with various sorts of cynical fabrications." 
Gorbachev thus artfully linked "explosions in the streets" and 
"airplane hijacking," as well as other forms of violence commonly view-
ed in the West as terrorism, with "exporting of counterrevolution" and 
"undeclared wars," two terms which the U.S.S.R. uses for U.S. and 
Western support of rebels in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
and Nicaragua. Obviously, significantly different perspectives on ter-
rorism and counter-terrorism exist in the Kremlin and the U.S. 
Disagreement abounds in policy as well. The U.S.S.R. frequently 
extends diplomatic and propaganda support to groups as varied as the 
PLO, the IRA, and the ANC. It also offers them training and logistics 
support, and on occasion may provide limited military assistance and in-
telligence information as well." Such support is frequently difficult to 
trace; nevertheless, it does occur. The Kremlin's reason for rendering 
support is straightforward: these groups, and others, are seen as national 
liberation movements—not terrorists. 
Soviet opposition to some forms of Western counter-terrorist activi-
ty is undertaken on a similar pretext. To the Soviets, much Western 
counter-terrorist activity is actually opposition to national liberation, a 
cover for the expansion of Western influence and intrusion of military 
forces, and counter-revolution." Despite the U.S.S.R.'s vehement 
rhetoric, however, the Kremlin has undertaken no publicly known con-
crete actions to counter activities that the West defines as counter-
terrorist. 
THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL LEVEL OF 
SOVIET POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
The Kremlin's insistence on the correctness of a broad socio-
political approach to unconventional conflict in the Third World should 
not overshadow the fact that in all three areas under discussion—support 
for revolution and national liberation, opposition to counter-revolution, 
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and a middle-ground approach to terrorism and counter-
terrorism—Soviet policies and strategies contain an extensive military-
technical component. 
This is neither surprising nor new. It is not surprising since it is in 
keeping with the Soviet Union's two-level approach to conflict; it is not 
new since the Soviet Union has been extensively involved in all three 
areas since at least the 1920s. For example, the Soviet Union through the 
Comintern sent Michael Borodin to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang 
forces to give them military advice and training in support of revolution 
and national liberation during the 1920s. Similarly, the Red Army fought 
unconventional "counter-revolutionary" conflicts in the Tambov cam-
paign (1920-24) and Basmachi war (mid-1920s-1941).s$ Finally, the 
U.S.S.R., again through the Comintern, had extensive links to com-
munist parties around the world during the 1920s, at least several of 
which actively engaged in terrorist activities during the decade. 
Here, however, the emphasis is not on military-technical activities in 
unconventional conflict during the 1920s, but during the 1980s. If a 
single word may be used to describe the Soviet military actions across the 
spectrum of unconventional conflict in the 1980s, that word is "flexibili-
ty." 
Revolution and National Liberation 
The U.S.S.R. is extremely cautious in its provision of military-
technical assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation 
movements. It rarely if ever introduces its own personnel to the country 
or region where revolution is taking place, and generally provides only 
limited quantities of older military equipment to revolutionary groups 
and national liberation movements. 
This caution probably stems from two sources. First, the outcomes 
of many revolutionary situations are usually in doubt for long periods of 
time. Thus, the Kremlin probably does not wish to become too closely in-
volved with groups that may not succeed. Second, the U.S.S.R. probably 
seeks to minimize its own involvement to lessen the chances of U.S. and 
Western reaction. Even the large-scale Soviet support to the MPLA 
before it acquired the full reins of government did not imply Soviet aban-
donment of caution since the U.S. at the time of the Soviet/Cuban effort 
was in the depths of its "Vietnam hangover." 
Nevertheless, Soviet caution does not imply lack of involvement. 
Fighters from the PLO, SWAPO, ANC, and several Eritrean movements 
have all received military training in the U.S.S.R., as did guerrillas from 
the FLN and MPLA before those movements became ruling govern-
ments. Other examples also exist. This training included weapons' use 
and maintenance, rudimentary field tactics, and discipline. It is probable 
that at least some revolutonary officers receive training in large unit tac-
tics and military strategy, but little definite proof exists of this." 
The Kremlin also provides indirect military-technical assistance to 
revolutionary groups and national liberation movements via third coun-
tries. SWAPO and the ANC both train in Angola, and a variety of Latin 
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American and African groups and movements train in Cuba. Eastern 
European states have also helped train revolutionary groups and national 
liberation movements as well.60 
Two additional key points must be made. First, the vast majority of 
guerrillas receive no training in the Soviet Union or third countries. They 
may be equipped with Soviet arms, but they have no direct exposure to 
Soviet or third country methods and personnel. Second, despite Soviet 
provision of limited training and equipment, and possibly because of the 
limited exposure of most guerrilla fighters to Soviet or third country 
methods and personnel, the Kremlin's emphasis remains on assuring the 
political reliability of the leadership of the various revolutionary groups 
and national liberation movements that it assists. 
This does not mean that the U.S.S.R. itself is necessarily "loyal" to 
those groups and movements that it assists. Yassir Arafat could attest to 
that," as could the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and other Eritrean 
groups formerly friendly with the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Eastern Euro-
pean states. The Eritrean case is particularly instructive in that once 
Mengistu Hâile-Mariam's ruling Dergue evidenced pro-Soviet sym-
pathies, the Soviets and their allies reclassified the ELF, moving it from 
the "revolutionary" to the "counter-revolutionary" category. This of 
course changed the ELF's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. In the 
words of one ELF officer who was trained in Cuba, "All my feelings 
about Cuba have changed. I hate them, and the Russians, too."" 
In sum, then, Soviet military-technical assistance to and support of 
revolutionary groups and national liberation movements may be easily 
encapsulated. First, it is for the most part limited. On rare occasions, 
most notably Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA in Angola before 
the MPLA established a ruling government, exceptions do exist. 
Generally, however, it is limited. Second, it is cautious, and allows 
"revolution" and "liberation" to proceed at its own pace. The Kremlin 
is not known to have urged Third World revolutionaries to move faster 
than they prefer; on occasion, the Kremlin has urged them to proceed 
more cautiously. Third, it is flexible, and changes as conditions warrant. 
The U.S.S.R. follows no apparent set guidelines in its provision of 
military-technical assistance and support, but responds to situations in a 
case-by-case manner. 
Taken together, limitations, caution, and flexibility allow the 
Kremlin to claim that the U.S.S.R. supports revolution and national 
liberation but does not export revolutions and national liberation. Such 
arguments may be specious in the West, but to Soviet Marxist-Leninists 
they are probably both legitimate and persuasive. 
Counter-Revolution 
The degree of Soviet military-technical involvement with unconven-
tional conflict escalates noticeably in those states where "socialist-path" 
governments are battling "counter-revolution." Soviet military-
technical efforts to combat "counter-revolution" are rarely limited. 
Neither may they in general terms be described as cautious. Seldom they 
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are demonstrably as flexible as, and possibly even more flexible than, 
Soviet military-technical efforts to assist and support revolutionary 
groups and national liberation movements. 
The Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern European states play major 
roles in training, equipping, and organizing the armed forces of 
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and 
Nicaragua. Training takes place both in the communist countries and the 
Third World states, and is frequently pervasive. One measure of the per-
vasiveness of Soviet training is that the Kremlin has seen fit in certain 
crucial Third World states to attach advisers to military units down to the 
battalion level." The tactics taught are frequently variations of Soviet 
tactics adapted for local conditions. As demonstrated earlier, the flow of 
military assistance from the Soviet Union to socialist-path states fighting 
"counter-revolution" goes up noticeably as well. Further, in 
Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet officers on occasion allegedly 
have planned military campaigns for indigenous forces against the 
' 'counter-revolutionaries. ' ' 
Soviet commitment to the struggle against "counter-revolution" is 
thus evident, and the U.S.S.R. correspondingly abandons not only the 
limited role evident in its support for revolution and national liberation 
but also a portion of its caution. However, this does not mean that the 
Kremlin abandons all caution. For example, the Soviet Union provides 
very carefully selected types and quantities of military support to 
Nicaragua in an effort to avoid eliciting an American response. 
Nicaragua has not received MiGs,64 nor have high-level Soviet military 
delegations overtly visited Managua.69 The Kremlin also has been careful 
to keep the number of its military advisers low. Even the quantity of 
military assistance sent—estimates range as high as $1 billion—is less im-
posing once it is realized that that assistance took place over seven years. 
Commitment is evident, but caution remains. 
Even in the case where the Kremlin exhibited the least caution in 
providing its own forces to oppose "counter-revolution," that is, in 
Afghanistan, its careful use of rhetoric and terminology allowed it to 
reverse policies with few adverse consequences. While many Soviet and 
non-Soviets alike agree that the Kremlin did not achieve its objectives in 
Afghanistan, the Soviets have officially declared that their "interna-
tionalist responsibilities" have been fulfilled and they can withdraw. 
More skeptical Soviet observers explain the withdrawal as the inevitable 
result of incorrect analysis by the Brezhnev regime of the "socio-political 
climate" that prevailed in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Regardless of which explanation is accurate, the end result was the 
same—the Soviets felt able to begin force reductions. 
The Soviet Union's policy reversal in Afghanistan clearly shows that 
even in its assistance to socialist-path states battling counter-revolution, 
it retains all the flexibility it exhibits in its assistance to and support of 
revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. In 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union for all practical purposes has controlled 
not only its own forces but also the Afghan military; the Soviet Union's 
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involvement has been total. In Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviet Union pro-
vides almost all the military equipment for the indigenous government, 
plans some military operations, cooperates extensively with Cuba and 
Eastern European states in training, and leaves the actual "counter-
revolutionary" fighting to Cuban and local armed forces. In Cambodia, 
the U.S.S.R. again provides almost all the military arms, but planning, 
training, and fighting are done primarily by the Vietnamese. In Nicaragua, 
the U.S.S.R. provides much of the equipment, cooperates with Cuba and 
Eastern Europe in extending training but only at a low-to-moderate level, 
apparently does little in the planning of operations, and refrains from 
fighting. In Mozambique, the U.S.S.R. provides little equipment, train-
ing, or planning, and again does none of the fighting. From country to 
country, then, Soviet military-technical attempts to combat "counter-
revolution" vary widely. Flexibility appears the order of the day. 
Flexibility also is evident in Soviet military-technical efforts to com-
bat "counter-revolution" in individual countries. Afghanistan provides 
the best example. During its first year of occupation of Afghanistan, the 
Soviet Union used large formations in its fight against the mujahadeen. 
This approach failed as the mujahadeen employed hit-and-run tactics 
against the Soviets. In late 1980 and throughout 1981, the Kremlin turn-
ed to a temporary defensive strategy, maintaining control over cities and 
towns, roads, military facilities communications sites, and other 
transportation arteries. Control of outlying areas was left to 
Afghanistan's own ineffective army. The change in Soviet strategy was 
dictated by: failure of the Kremlin's large formation strategy; major 
uprisings in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Sorubi, and Aybak; and mujaha-
deen attacks on Soviet logistics. In 1982 and 1983 the Soviets increased 
their use of helicopters and by 1984 had begun to employ high altitude 
carpet bombing attacks. The U.S.S.R. in 1984 also started to attack 
civilian targets in areas of strong resistance, and used large conventional 
units and small special units in guerrilla-style operations. In 1985 and 
1986, the Soviets conducted sweeps near the Iranian and Pakistani 
borders in an effort to close mujahadeen supply routes out of those 
countries. Collectively, Soviet efforts have been categorized as "in-
timidation and genocide," "reprisals," "subversion," and "military 
forays." Soviet military tactics included aerial warfare, sweep-and-
destroy missions, encirclement efforts, airborne strikes, increased use of 
light infantry, convoying techniques, defoliation, and use of the Afghan 
army." Throughout these changes, the Kremlin continued to use special 
purpose forces (SPETSNAZ) to great effect." 
Despite its insistence on flexibility, the Soviet Union has had no 
great success with its efforts to combat "counter-revolution" in socialist-
path states. Part of the reason for this is the external support that the 
U.S. and other states have provided anti-Soviet and 
anti-"socialist-path" revolutionaries. An even larger part of the reason is 
the old maxim of guerrilla warfare that guerrillas win by not losing and 
that those fighting guerrillas lose by not winning. For the present, despite 
its flexible approach, the Kremlin fits into the latter category, as the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan well illustrates. 
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But the U.S.S.R. does have certain advantages that over time could 
prove important in its efforts to combat "counter-revolution." First, 
there is little meaningful domestic opposition in the U.S.S.R. when the 
Kremlin decides to fight a war against "counter-revolution." Second, 
the Soviet Union has extensive patience; it remained in Afghanistan for 
over eight years, and has supported Cuban troops in Angola for over 
thirteen years and in Ethiopia for more than eleven years. Finally, the 
Kremlin has exhibited willingness to be extremely brutal against civilian 
populations, at least in Afghanistan. 
All told, then, the Soviet Union is clearly willing to help fight 
"counter-revolution" and willingly extends supplies, and in some cases, 
even its own personnel. There is no single Soviet military-technical policy 
or strategy; flexibility remains the watchword. Whether Soviet flexibility 
will lead to success is less certain; to date, outside of the U.S.S.R. itself, 
the Kremlin has no real successes to point to in its record of unconven-
tional conflict against "counter-revolutionary" forces. 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
Little can be said about Soviet military-technical involvement with 
terrorism or counter-terrorism. That the U.S.S.R. trains, provides equip-
ment for, and supports some terrorist groups appears beyond debate. 
Just how extensive Soviet involvement is and how much, if any, Soviet 
military-technical involvement with terrorist groups may have changed in 
the wake of vehement public Soviet condemnation of hijackings, kidnap-
pings, and assassinations is less clear. 
The same is true for Soviet involvement at the military-technical 
level with counter-terrorism. Soviet protestations of opposition to 
counter-terrorism to the contrary, the U.S.S.R. has evidenced no great 
willingness to become involved in meaningful international efforts to 
combat terrorism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Soviet policies and strategies regarding unconventional conflict 
make it evident that Soviet statements about the reality of systemic con-
frontation between East and West are more than mere rhetoric. To the 
Soviets, unconventional conflict in all three of the manifestations ex-
amined here—revolution and national liberation, counter-revolution, 
and terrorism and counter-terrorism—is a critical component of that 
ongoing confrontation. 
In their policies and strategies vis-à-vis unconventional conflict, the 
Soviets are neither reckless nor impatient. At the socio-political level of 
analysis, they provide a variety of different forms of assistance and sup-
port to their friends and allies engaged in unconventional conflicts. At 
the military-technical level, this flexibility is even more apparent, 
especially as illustrated by the Kremlin's willingness and ability to dif-
ferentiate between policies and strategies applied in one country in op-
position to "counter-revolution" and those applied in other countries. 
Further proof of flexibility is provided by the Soviet Union's willingness 
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and ability to change policies and strategies when confronted with 
evidence that previous policies and strategies are not working, or are not 
working as well as required. 
The flexibility of Soviet pohcies and strategies toward unconven-
tional conflict presents sizeable challenges to the U.S. and the West. The 
U.S. and the West must at a minimum respond with equally flexible 
policies and strategies, fashioning them to meet challenges as individual 
situations warrant. No "cookbook" solution to unconventional conflict 
appears possible. 
Nevertheless, emphasis on flexible policies and strategies should not 
be permitted to obscure an even more salient point that is central to 
Soviet policies and strategies and must be central to U.S. and Western 
policies and strategies as well: the socio-political level of analysis and 
understanding is more critical than the military-technical, but neither can 
be ignored. 
It is doubly ironic that if this analysis is correct, then the U.S.S.R. is 
less well positioned than the U.S. and the West to cope with unconven-
tional conflict. The first irony is that the Soviet Union has recognized the 
primacy of socio-political analysis, but is poorly equipped to deal with it. 
The Soviet system has proven adept at producing military goods, but it 
has not yet proven its ability to match Western societies in providing 
economic benefits and political freedoms. The second irony concerns 
U.S. and Western policies and strategies. With sizeable advantages in 
economic capabilities and political systems, it remains to be seen whether 
the U.S. and the West can fashion political and economic policies wise 
enough to meet the socio-political challenges that serve as the seedbed for 
unconventional conflict. 
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Conflicts and Wars since 1960 
Approximate Location 
of Conflict/War 
Latin America 
1. Argentina 
2. Argentina 
3. Brazil 
4. Chile 
5. Chile 
6. Domin. Repub. 
7. El Salvador 
8. Guatemala 
9. Honduras 
10. Jamaica 
11. Nicaragua 
12. Nicaragua 
13. Peru 
Year 
1976-79 
1982 
1980 
1973 
1974 
1965 
1979-87 
1966-85 
1969 
1980 
1978-79 
1981-87 
1983-87 
Description 
"Disappearances" 
Falklands War 
Terrorism 
Coup 
Govt. Executions 
US Intervention 
Civil War 
Anti-Indian 
El Salv. Invasion 
Election Violence 
Anti-Somoza 
Anti-Sandinista 
Shining Path Maoists 
Approximate 
Deaths 
14,000 
1,000 
1,000 
5,000 
20,000 
3,000 
65,000 
45,000 
2,000 
1,000 
35,000 
18,000 
4,000 
Unco 
C 
o 
Conflicts and Wars since 1960 
Approximate Location 
of Conflict/War 
Middle East 
14. Cyprus 
15. Egypt 
16. Iran 
17. Iraq 
18. Israel 
19. Jordan 
20. Lebanon 
21. Lebanon 
22. Lebanon 
23. Syria 
24. Turkey 
25. Yemen 
26. Yemen (South) 
Year 
1974 
1967 
1978-83 
1980-87 
1973 
1970 
1975-76 
1982 
1983-87 
1982 
1977-80 
1962-69 
1987 
Description 
Turkey Invasion 
Six Day War 
Shah Overthrow 
& Aftermath 
Iran-Iraq War 
Yom Kippur War 
Anti-Palestinian 
Muslim v. Christian 
Israeli Invasion 
Civil War & Unrest 
Sunni Massacre 
Terrorism & Coup 
Civil War 
Coup 
Approximate 
Deaths 
5,000 
75,000 
7,000 
650,000 
16,000 
2,000 
100,000 
20,000 
20,000 
10,000 
5,000 
101,000 
15,000 
Un 
Conflicts and 
Approximate Location 
of Conflict/War Year Description 
South Asia 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
India 
India 
India 
India 
India 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka 
1978-79 
1979-87 
1971 
1962 
1965 
1971 
1983 
1984 
1986-87 
1973-77 
1971 
1984-87 
Insurrection 
Soviets invade 
India invades 
China border 
Pakistan/Kashmir 
Pakistan border 
Assam election 
Ethnic violence 
Sikh conflict 
Baluchi conflict 
Attempted coup 
Tamil violence 
Vars since 1960 
Approximate Unc 
Deaths 
100,000 
400,000 
1,500,000 
2,000 
20,000 
11,000 
3,000 
3,000 
3,000 
9,000 
2,000 
5,000 
Conflicts and Wars since 1960 
Approximate Location 
of Conflict/War Year Description 
Approximate 
Deaths 
Un 
LA 
Far East 
39. Burma 
40. Cambodia 
41. Cambodia 
42. Cambodia 
43. China 
44. China 
45. Indonesia 
46. Indonesia 
47. Laos 
48. Laos 
49. Philippines 
50. Philippines 
51. Vietnam 
52. Vietnam 
53. Vietnam 
1980 
1970-75 
1975-78 
1978-87 
1967-68 
1983-84 
1965-66 
1975-80 
1960-62 
1963-73 
1972-80 
1972-87 
1959-65 
1965-75 
1979 
Civil violence 
U.S. & Viet invade 
Pol Pot massacres 
Viet invasion 
Cultural revolution 
Govt, executions 
Abortive coup 
East Timor 
Pathet Lao 
Viet invade, U.S. bombs 
Muslim revolt 
Communists and others 
NLF/NVN v. SVN 
Americanization & 
NVN invades SVN 
China invades 
5,000 
156,000 
2,000,000 
50,000 
50,000 
5,000 
100,000 
100,000 
5,000 
19,000 
20,000 
20,000 
300,000 
2,058,000 
30,000 
Conflicts and 
Approximate Location 
of Conflict/War Year Description 
Africa 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Algeria 
Algeria 
Angola 
Angola 
Burundi 
Chad 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Mozambique 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
Nigeria 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
1954-62 
1962-63 
1961-75 
1975-87 
1972 
1980-87 
1974-87 
1976-80 
1981 
1962-74 
1952-63 
1965-75 
1981-87 
1967-70 
1980-81 
1984 
1956-65 
Anti-France 
Civil conflict 
Anti-Portugal 
Civil war 
Ethnic massacres 
Civil war 
Eritrea 
Ogaden war 
Ethnic conflict 
Anti-Portugal 
Anti-Britain 
Anti-Portugal 
Civil war 
Biafra 
Islam Fundamentalists 
Islam Fundamentalists 
Ethnic massacres 
Vars since 1960 
Approximate Un 
Deaths 
320,000 
2,000 
55,000 
25,000 
100,000 
10,000 
600,000 
36,000 
1,000 
15,000 
15,000 
30,000 
100,000 
2,000,000 
5,000 
1,000 
108,000 
Conflicts and Wars since 1960 
Approximate Location 
of Conflict/War Year Description 
Approximate 
Deaths 
Un 
Africa (cont'd) 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
u. 7 7 ' 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Uganda 
Uganda 
Uganda 
Uganda 
West Sahara 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 
1984-87 Ethnic violence 5,000 
1963-72 Black v. Arab 300,000 
1984-87 Civil war 5,000 
1966 Secession attempt 2,000 
1971-78 Civil war & Idi Amin 300,000 
1978-79 Tanzania & Amin 3,000 
1981-86 Army massacres 102,000 
1975-87 Polisario war 15,000 
1960-65 Katanga & aftermath 100,000 
1964 Civil strife 1,000 
1972-79 Black v. white govt. 12,000 
1983 Political violence 2,000 
Note: This list includes only those conflicts and wars in which at least 1,000 people per year wer 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, the Red Guard terrorist a 
situation, and the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada do not appear. 
SOURCE: Adapted from Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1985 (Washing 
by author. Assessments of unconventional conflict and known U.S. and Soviet involve 
qualitative. 
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